$ cat writeup.md…
$ cat writeup.md…
Hack.lu2026
Task: Windows AD infra with a DC (ADDS+ADCS+DNS) and a member server exposing a leftover WDS REMINST share. Solution: de-obfuscate the unattend autologon password (strip trailing 'Password'), abuse a GPO the service account fully controls to run a SYSTEM command, dump the machine account, request an ESC17 cert and serve a rogue HTTPS WSUS.
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Agile Corp lives by one rule: ship it. Everything else — reviews, patches, the cleanup — got pushed to next quarter. Next quarter was three years ago. Disclaimers: Add both Servers to your hosts file! On every Administrator Desktop lies something valuable!
English summary. Two hosts are provided over a WireGuard tunnel:
dc 10.244.0.10 (dc.agile-corp.hacklu, Windows Server 2022 running AD DS + ADCS + DNS) and
srv 10.244.0.20 (srv.agile-corp.hacklu, a member server with a leftover WDS deployment
share REMINST). The domain is AGILE-CORP / agile-corp.hacklu. The goal is to read the
valuable file on the Administrator desktop. The chain is: leak a credential from the WDS
unattend file → pivot the service account's GPO write access to SYSTEM on the member server →
recover a Domain Computer identity → obtain an ADCS certificate for the WSUS hostname (ESC17) →
run a rogue HTTPS WSUS server to execute code as SYSTEM on the DC.
Authors: NeffIsBack (author of wsuks) and Steffen Thamm. Public research for this technique:
ESC17 — "Using ADCS to Attack HTTPS-Enabled WSUS Clients" (blog.digitrace.de) and TrustedSec's
"WSUS Is SUS".
dc = Windows Server 2022, AD DS + ADCS (agile-corp-Root-CA) + DNS. Open ports: 53, 88,
135, 139, 389, 445, 464, 593, 636, 3268, 3269, 9389, plus dynamic RPC (no HTTP — web
enrollment/NDES is disabled).srv = member server, SMB + RPC only. Shares: ADMIN$, C$, IPC$, and REMINST
(a WDS/WDS leftover, recursively listable by Guest).Administrator, svc_deploy; computers DC$, SRV$.
No WSUS/CA/PKI service accounts, no kerberoastable SPNs, no AS-REP roastable accounts....
$ grep --similar