$ cat writeup.md…
$ cat writeup.md…
sunshinectf2026
Task: forking pwn service (seccomp-jailed parent front desk + child vault over an XOR-obfuscated fd-3 socketpair) exposing a signed OOB slot index in the child's GET handler and a SUBMIT stack overflow in the parent. Solution: ROP the parent to invoke the obfuscating send helper with a body-carrying op-3 GET(-4) frame that reads the flag slot below the intended table, then flush the queued reply via RELAY.
$ cat /etc/rate-limit
Rate limit reached (20 reads/hour per IP). Showing preview only — full content returns at the next hour roll-over.
The safe house processes reports and files notes for the field. Get past the front desk and into the vault.
English summary: An ELF64 x86-64 service (nc chal.sunshinectf.games 26007) forks into a
seccomp-jailed "front desk" (parent) that talks to a "vault" (child) over an internal
socket. The parent cannot read the flag itself; the flag is only reachable through the
child. Combine a logic bug and a memory-corruption bug to make the child leak the flag
back through the front desk.
0x400000), NX, Full RELRO, no stack canary.socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM) then fork():
dup2'd to fd 3.0x405060, derived from getpid() via a
splitmix-style hash and computed before fork(), so both processes agree on it.fcn.00401be0 using this key.
We never need to know the key value.[op:1][len:2 big-endian][pad:1]
followed by len body bytes.fcn.00401c40, child send = fcn.00401d50 (address 0x401d50),
parent RELAY handler = fcn.00401f70, SUBMIT handler = fcn.00401ed0....