cryptoPromedium
Darling
spbctf
Task: RSA with small exponent e=3 and null-byte padding. Solution: Since m^e < n, modular reduction doesn't occur; remove padding factor algebraically and extract integer cube root with gmpy2.iroot().
$ ls tags/ techniques/
integer_cube_rootrsa_small_exponent_attackknown_padding
π
Permission denied (requires tier.pro)
Sign in to access full writeups
Sign in with GitHub to continue. No email required.
$sign in$ grep --similar
Similar writeups
- [crypto][Pro]Secret correspondenceβ spbctf
- [crypto][Pro]ChristmasRSAβ grodno_new_year_2026
- [crypto][Pro]weird modulusβ spbctf
- [crypto][Pro]baby modulus β Small RSAβ spbctf
- [crypto][Pro]ΠΠ΅ΡΡΠ»ΡΠΉ RSA (Funny RSA)β hackerlab